CIS/Eurasia Desk | Anastasiya Ugale

Can the AIFC Court Enforce Foreign Arbitral Awards?

Central Asia
Three events in twelve days reshaped foreign arbitral award enforcement in Kazakhstan in May 2026: the AIFC Court granted preliminary enforcement of a USD 1.4 billion ICC award in Naftogaz v. Gazprom (15 May); the Minister of Justice publicly stated the order would not be executed in Kazakhstan and that the AIFC Court lacked jurisdiction (25 May); and in POSCO, a different AIFC judge declined jurisdiction outright and called the prior approach wrongly decided (27 May). Foreign award holders weighing enforcement strategy in Kazakhstan now face real uncertainty about a venue that until recently looked promising — though investors with treaty cover that directly references the AIFC may be in a materially different position.

What Happened — Three Events in Twelve Days

In the second half of May 2026, three closely connected developments reshaped the question of whether foreign arbitral awards can be enforced through the Astana International Financial Centre Court (AIFC Court).

15 May 2026 — Preliminary enforcement granted in Naftogaz v. Gazprom. The AIFC Court of First Instance, sitting through Justice Andrew Spink, granted preliminary enforcement to a USD 1.37 billion ICC award. The award arose from a Zurich-seated arbitration over a 2019 gas transportation contract that Gazprom stopped performing after Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Naftogaz filed a "without notice" enforcement application within the AIFC territory in January 2026; the order was made subject to a 14-day window for Gazprom to apply to set it aside.

25 May 2026 — The Minister of Justice intervenes. In a structured on-the-record interview with the Kazakh legal news outlet zakon.kz, Minister of Justice Yerlan Sarsembayev stated publicly that the AIFC Court's order would not be executed on Kazakhstan's territory, set out the Ministry's view that the AIFC Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter, and disclosed that the Ministry is preparing legislative amendments on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Kazakhstan.

27 May 2026 — Jurisdiction declined in POSCO. A different judge of the same court, Justice Rupert Jackson, declined jurisdiction to enforce an ICC award arising from a 2013 loan agreement between the Korean company POSCO and a Kazakh state-owned entity. The claimant had been frustrated by repeated refusals from Almaty courts; the AIFC route was its alternative. Justice Jackson held that the AIFC Court's jurisdiction extends only to awards rendered under the AIFC International Arbitration Centre (AIAC) Rules, and concluded that the prior rulings extending jurisdiction to foreign awards — Pacific Trade House Limited v. Altai Polymetals LLP, Roads Department of Georgia v. Todini, and Naftogaz v. Gazprom — had been "wrongly decided.

The Article 14(4) Translation Problem

The dispute over the AIFC Court's foreign-award jurisdiction rests on a translation issue that, in a serious international financial centre, should not exist.

The AIFC Constitutional Statute is binding only in its Kazakh and Russian versions; the English translation has no official status. The translation posted on the AIFC website states that "[a]wards of arbitration courts in the Republic of Kazakhstan are to be recognised and enforced in the territory of the AIFC in accordance with legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan." That formulation reads as if Article 14(4) covers Kazakhstani court judgments, not arbitral awards from any source.

A second English version, treated as a working translation in prior AIFC cases, reads differently: "Recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in the territory of the Centre shall be carried out in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan". That version reads more naturally as a general enforcement provision covering arbitral awards as a category.

Naftogaz relied on the second translation. POSCO, having lost in Almaty, did the same. In POSCO, the court examined the underlying Kazakh and Russian text with the assistance of trilingual counsel and concluded that the second translation is closer to the original — but Justice Jackson then held that, even on the correct translation, Article 14(4) is limited to AIAC arbitration awards.

Two Rulings, Two Approaches

The two judges took fundamentally different approaches to the same legal problem.

Justice Spink, in Naftogaz, sidestepped the Article 14(4) question. He acknowledged the translation issue and noted that even the more claimant-friendly version did not unambiguously cover foreign awards. Rather than resolve the constitutional point, he grounded the AIFC Court's jurisdiction in two pieces of secondary legislation: Article 40(3) of the AIFC Court Regulations, which directs the court to issue rules for the enforcement of "judgments and arbitration awards," and Article 45(1) of the AIFC Arbitration Regulations, which provides that "[a]n arbitral award, irrespective of the state or jurisdiction in which it was made, shall be recognised as binding in the AIFC." On that basis, Spink found jurisdiction and granted preliminary enforcement on a without-notice basis.

Justice Jackson, in POSCO, confronted Article 14(4) directly and held it to be controlling. He identified four reasons Article 14(4) refers only to AIAC arbitrations: the heading of the provision references the AIAC; it would be strange for the legislature to change the subject after announcing the heading; non-AIAC parties have not consented to AIFC Court jurisdiction and do not fall within Article 13 of the Constitutional Statute, which defines that jurisdiction; and reading Article 14(4) as supplementing Article 13 would be "bizarre." On the AIFC Arbitration Regulations point, Jackson held that subordinate legislation cannot extend the court's jurisdiction beyond what the Constitutional Statute permits. The Arbitration Regulations therefore could not save Naftogaz's reasoning.

Notably, Justice Jackson addressed the political context directly. The Naftogaz ruling had prompted a formal intervention from the Minister of Justice ten days later, and Justice Jackson stated that he had taken "no notice whatsoever" of that debate, focusing solely on the legal issues. The fact that he felt the need to say so is itself significant.

The Ministry of Justice's Intervention

Between the two rulings, the Ministry of Justice put its position on the record.

In an interview with zakon.kz published on 25 May 2026, Minister of Justice Yerlan Sarsembayev set out the Ministry's view that the Naftogaz v. Gazprom order will not be executed on Kazakhstan's territory. The framing was unsentimental: Kazakhstan, he said, will not become a "transit venue" for the execution of awards that have no legal connection to it.

The substantive arguments are striking in how closely they anticipate the reasoning Justice Jackson would adopt two days later. The Minister identified four reasons the case lacks any jurisdictional connection to the AIFC: Gazprom is not a participant in the AIFC; the disputed gas-transit transaction was not concluded within the AIFC; the dispute is not governed by AIFC law; and the parties did not agree to refer recognition and enforcement to the AIFC Court. On this basis, the Minister argued, the Constitutional Statute limits the AIFC Court's jurisdiction to matters and parties connected to the AIFC, or to disputes the parties have mutually agreed to refer there. That is essentially the structural reading of Articles 13 and 14 that Justice Jackson then arrived at in POSCO.

The Minister also flagged the procedural posture that makes the Naftogaz order vulnerable on its own terms: the order was made without participation of the respondent, is notification in character, has not entered into legal force, and is subject to the 14-day window for Gazprom to apply for cancellation, with a full inter partes hearing to follow.

On the broader New York Convention framework, the Minister distinguished Kazakhstan's general treaty compliance from the AIFC route specifically. Kazakhstan is a party to the 1958 Convention, and Article 503 of the Civil Procedure Code governs the proper venue for enforcement applications in the ordinary courts: the court where the dispute was considered, the location of the respondent's legal entity body, or — failing those — the location of the debtor's property. The Minister observed pointedly that Gazprom's location is known, implying that Kazakhstan is not the proper venue under that rule.

Two further points from the interview have practical weight. First, the Minister disclosed that the Ministry of Justice is currently preparing legislative amendments on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Kazakhstan — meaning the statutory framework on which both Naftogaz and POSCO turn is itself in motion. Second, Vice-Minister of Justice Daniel Vaisov was quoted as having earlier emphasised that the AIFC Court did not consider the substance of the dispute, only the question of recognition of the Swiss arbitral decision — a careful reminder that the AIFC proceedings did not relitigate the merits.

The combined message of the interview is direct: the executive branch of Kazakhstan does not accept the Naftogaz line of AIFC jurisprudence as a basis for enforcing foreign awards in Kazakhstan, and legislative changes to clarify the position are in progress.

Why This Matters for Enforcement Strategy in Kazakhstan

The AIFC has spent the better part of a decade positioning itself as a common-law, English-language enforcement venue in Central Asia, distinct from Kazakhstan's ordinary courts. That positioning rested on two assumptions: that the AIFC Court would enforce foreign arbitral awards, and that it would do so independently of political pressure.

Both assumptions are now genuinely in question for ordinary commercial enforcement.

The POSCO ruling matters not just because it refuses jurisdiction in one case. It matters because Justice Jackson explicitly held the prior case law to be wrongly decided and further exposed a genuine gap in the AIFC Constitutional Statute. Until an appellate court resolves the split or the legislature mandates a certain outcome, the AIFC Court is operating under conflicting first-instance authority on foreign-award jurisdiction. A claimant filing today cannot reliably predict which approach the assigned judge will take.

The Ministry of Justice intervention adds a second layer of risk. Even where a claimant obtains a favourable AIFC order, the practical question of execution against Kazakh assets requires cooperation from Kazakhstan's enforcement institutions — and the Minister has now stated, on the record, that the Naftogaz order will not be executed on Kazakhstan's territory, whether or not there are any genuine assets to enforce the order against. The doctrinal question of AIFC jurisdiction is therefore not the only obstacle; a sustained AIFC enforcement order would face declared executive opposition at the implementation stage.

It is also worth being precise about what Naftogaz did and did not decide. The order was issued without notice to Gazprom, on a preliminary basis, and is subject to a 14-day set-aside window. Gazprom may yet appear and brief the jurisdictional question fully. If the appellate court takes Justice Jackson's view — or simply if Gazprom raises the same arguments the Minister has already articulated — the Naftogaz order is at meaningful risk.

The other route — enforcement through ordinary Kazakhstani courts — has its own history. POSCO failed in Almaty before turning to the AIFC. The Almaty courts refused enforcement on grounds (non-receipt of the award by the respondent, a parallel criminal investigation against the respondent's former general director) that, on the face of the AIFC's description, did not invite confidence. Foreign award holders looking to Kazakhstan have, in practical terms, two general doors: one that is now openly contested, and one that has been hostile. The Minister's reference to Article 503 of the Civil Procedure Code signals that the ordinary-courts route will be argued on strict venue grounds wherever it is invoked.

Practical Takeaways

For investors and counsel considering enforcement of a foreign arbitral award against assets in Kazakhstan, several points follow.

First, do not plan an enforcement strategy around the assumption that the AIFC Court will accept jurisdiction over ordinary commercial foreign awards as a general matter. The question is genuinely unresolved at first instance, an appellate ruling will likely be needed before the position is settled, and even a favourable AIFC order may face declared executive opposition at the implementation stage. Any without-notice or preliminary order obtained on the Naftogaz line of reasoning is exposed if the respondent appears and briefs the jurisdictional point fully.

Second, identify the asset profile early. If the target assets are concentrated in Kazakhstan and cannot easily be reached through other jurisdictions, the courts of Kazakhstan may be the only viable option absent parties' consent to AIFC's jurisdiction. If assets are also located elsewhere — including in jurisdictions where New York Convention enforcement is more predictable — those routes should be considered first, or in parallel.

Third, expect the jurisdiction issue to be fully argued. After POSCO, and given the Ministry of Justice's articulated position, no AIFC enforcement application targeting a foreign award is likely to proceed without a fully briefed jurisdictional defence, even where the respondent did not initially appear. Counsel should be prepared to address the Article 14(4) text and the hierarchy between the Constitutional Statute and the Arbitration Regulations as a distinguishing ground from POSCO. For parallel ordinary-court enforcement, the strict venue rule in Article 503 of the Civil Procedure Code will also need to be addressed.

Fourth, watch the legislative reform. The Ministry of Justice has announced that work on amending the recognition-and-enforcement framework for foreign arbitral awards is underway. Until that work is complete and the direction of the amendment is visible, the planning landscape is unstable. Whether the reform broadens or narrows the AIFC route or disturbs the position in the ordinary courts will materially affect strategy.

Finally, watch the appellate level. The split between Naftogaz and POSCO will need resolution by the AIFC Court of Appeal, by legislative clarification of Article 14(4), or by an officially translated and published English text of the Constitutional Statute that settles the meaning. Any of those would change the planning landscape; until one occurs, the position is unclear.

FAQ

Does the AIFC Court enforce foreign arbitral awards?
At present, the answer is contested. In Naftogaz v. Gazprom, the Court of First Instance granted preliminary enforcement of a foreign ICC award. Eight days later, in POSCO, a different judge of the same court declined jurisdiction and held the prior approach to be wrongly decided. The Ministry of Justice has also publicly stated that the Naftogaz order will not be executed in Kazakhstan. The position is uncertain for ordinary commercial enforcement.

What is Article 14(4) of the AIFC Constitutional Statute?
Article 14(4) is the AIFC Constitutional Statute provision addressing the enforcement of arbitration awards within the AIFC territory. Its meaning has been disputed because the official text is in Kazakh and Russian, and the available English translations differ. Justice Jackson in POSCO held that, on the correct translation, Article 14(4) covers only awards rendered under the AIFC International Arbitration Centre (AIAC) Rules. The Ministry of Justice has adopted essentially the same reading.

What has the Kazakh Ministry of Justice said about the AIFC ruling?
In an interview with zakon.kz published on 25 May 2026, Minister of Justice Yerlan Sarsembayev stated that the Naftogaz v. Gazprom order would not be executed on Kazakhstan's territory and that the AIFC Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter. The Minister relied on the absence of any AIFC-connecting factors — Gazprom is not an AIFC participant, the disputed transaction was not concluded within the AIFC, the dispute is not governed by AIFC law, and the parties did not agree to refer enforcement to the AIFC Court. The Minister also disclosed that legislative amendments on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Kazakhstan are in preparation.

Can foreign arbitral awards be enforced in Kazakhstan more generally?
Kazakhstan is a party to the New York Convention, and foreign arbitral awards are in principle enforceable through the ordinary courts under Article 503 of the Civil Procedure Code, which sets the venue at the place where the dispute was considered, the location of the respondent's legal entity, or the location of the debtor's property. In practice, the experience of foreign claimants in Almaty has been mixed — POSCO failed there before turning to the AIFC. Enforcement planning in Kazakhstan should account for both forums, the strict venue rule, and the possibility that neither delivers a quick result.

What is the difference between AIAC awards and foreign awards at the AIFC?
The AIFC International Arbitration Centre (AIAC) is the AIFC's in-house arbitral institution. AIAC awards are issued under the AIAC Rules within the AIFC framework, and the AIFC Court is the supervisory court for those arbitrations. Foreign awards — for example, ICC or UNCITRAL awards seated outside Kazakhstan — are issued under different rules in different jurisdictions. The unresolved question is whether the AIFC Court's enforcement jurisdiction extends to that second category at all, and the answer may differ depending on whether the underlying claim has a layer that supplies AIFC consent.

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